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1. Introduction
After several decades of moderate growth and relatively
little controversy in for-profit college education, the 2000s
ushered in a new era in higher education. The low cost of
providing online education, the availability of federal
student aid, and the growing number of students seeking
skills beyond the high school level, combined to produce
enormous growth in the for-profit sector. Since 2000,
enrollment in for-profit colleges has more than tripled,
climbing to 2.5 million students in 2010 (National Center
for Education Statistics (NCES), 2012, Tables 219 and 222).
With this growth has come increased attention from
policymakers, the media, the education community, and
students themselves. In the past few years, reports of
unscrupulous recruiting practices, fraud in federal finan-
cial aid programs, low graduation rates, and high student
loan default rates (e.g., Goodman, 2010; Lewin, 2010;
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO),
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A B S T R A C T
A lengthy literature estimating the returns to education has largely ignored the for-profit
sector. In this paper, we estimate the earnings gains to for-profit college attendance using
restricted-access data from the 1997 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97).
Using an individual fixed effects estimation strategy that allows us to control for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics of students, we find that students who enroll in
associate’s degree programs in for-profit colleges experience earnings gains of about 10%
relative to high school graduates with no college degree, conditional on employment.
Since associate’s degree students attend for an average of 2.6 years, this translates to a 4%
return per year of education in a for-profit college, slightly lower than estimates of returns
for other sectors found in the literature.
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and Pensions, 2012) have led to new policy proposals and
an intense debate over the costs and benefits of for-profit
higher education. Notably, the Obama administration
recently proposed controversial ‘‘gainful employment’’
regulations that would link an institution’s eligibility for
federal student aid to student debt, default rates, and labor
market outcomes (Federal Register, 2014).
Central to the debate over these regulations and the
future of the for-profit industry is the question of the
quality of a for-profit education. Those arguing in favor of
additional regulation believe that for-profit colleges leave
students with insurmountable debt and few skills, while
proponents argue that these institutions provide valuable
job training for underserved students. Both sides rely
heavily on anecdotal evidence and simple comparisons of
for-profit students with students in other sectors. Without
a better understanding of the causal effects of a for-profit
education on earnings, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
assess the merits of the proposed regulations, other
policies affecting for-profit students, and the sector as a
whole.
This study provides an assessment of college quality in
the for-profit sector by estimating the labor market
returns, or earnings gains, to associate’s degree programs
in for-profit colleges. We focus on associate’s degree
programs due to data restrictions, but also because of the
importance of the for-profit sector in sub-baccalaureate
education. For-profit colleges account for a disproportion-
ate share of associate’s degree enrollment and degree
receipt. For-profits enroll 11% of all postsecondary
students, yet they confer 21% of all associate’s degrees –
about 194,000 each year (National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES), 2012, Table 219).1
A long literature on the returns to education has
focused on estimating the earnings gains generated by a
year of high school or four-year college. Several studies
have also assessed the returns to associate’s degrees in
public community colleges, but for-profit sub-baccalaure-
ate education has received much less attention in the
literature.2 Our study fills this gap in the literature,
attempting to mitigate a crucial endogeneity problem
that plagues studies of earnings gains: both observable and
unobservable factors may jointly influence a student’s
decision to attend a for-profit institution and her subse-
quent earnings. For example, students who pursue a
degree at a for-profit college may be more motivated than
students who do not enroll in any postsecondary educa-
tion, but motivation can also independently influence
subsequent labor market success. Such endogeneity issues
can bias cross-sectional OLS estimates of the impact of for-
profit colleges on employment and earnings.
To address this problem we draw on 14 years of data
contained in the restricted-access 1997 panel of the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY97) to
implement an individual fixed effects approach. Unlike
bachelor’s degree candidates, students pursuing associ-
ate’s degrees often work before, during, and after they
attend college, allowing us to compare an individual
student’s earnings after attendance to her earnings before.
We compare the before–after earnings gains of for-profit
associate’s degree students to a falsified before–after for
high school graduates without college degrees, generating
a difference-in-difference estimate of the returns to for-
profit college attendance.
The individual fixed effects control for all time-
invariant student characteristics that may bias cross-
sectional estimates of returns, but time-varying unob-
servables and dynamic selection issues may still remain. To
address such concerns, we include an extensive set of
controls including an individual-specific county of resi-
dence trend, an indicator for the years in which individuals
are enrolled in college, and an indicator to control for pre-
education dips in earnings among for-profit students. We
conduct many robustness checks to test the sensitivity of
our estimates to the inclusion of various controls, different
measures of earnings, alternate samples, and heteroge-
neous effects.
We find that students enrolled in associate’s degree
programs in for-profit colleges experience a 10% increase
in weekly earnings, conditional on employment, in our
baseline fixed effects specification. Dividing by 2.6 to
account for the average length of enrollment yields a 4%
return per year of education – a result that is incredibly
robust to various assumptions and specifications. Most of
the increase comes from hourly wages rather than more
hours worked per week. For-profit students are also
slightly more likely to be employed full-time than our
control group of high school graduates, but we find no
difference in the likelihood of any employment. Uncondi-
tional estimates including observations with zero earnings
(thereby conflating employment and earnings effects)
suggest higher earnings gains of around 18%, or 7% per
year. We also find suggestive evidence that students
completing associate’s degrees in for-profits earn about
20% more than their counterparts who dropout.
Overall, our results suggest that students enrolling in
associate’s degree programs in for-profit colleges earn
positive returns on the order of 4% (conditional on
employment) to 7% (unconditional) per year. These
estimates are slightly higher than other estimates of for-
profit returns (Turner, 2012), but fall below estimates of
the returns to public community colleges (Jacobson et al.,
2005; Jepsen et al., in press) and traditional four-year
colleges (Oreopolous & Petronijevic, 2013) found in the
literature. They also fall below the returns needed to offset
the private and social costs of for-profit associate’s degree
attendance (Cellini, 2012), suggesting that for-profits may
not be worthwhile for the average student.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2
reviews the literature on the returns to education and
Section 3 provides background on for-profit colleges.
Section 4 details our estimation strategy. Section 5
1 Although bachelor’s degree and graduate programs are among the
fastest growing in the for-profit sector (Deming, Goldin, & Katz, 2012),
for-profits still account for just 7% of bachelor’s degrees and 9% of
graduate degrees conferred (National Center for Education Statistics
(NCES), 2012, Table 219). In contrast, for-profits confer 30% of all
diplomas and certificates. We cannot examine the returns to diplomas
and certificates given data constraints.
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cludes.
elated literature
Over the past half-century, a large literature has
eloped to measure the returns to schooling. Reviews
he literature by Card (1999, chap. 30) and report that
 additional year of education results in earnings gains
the range of 6–9%. More recent and better-identified
lyses reveal higher returns for college attendance,
raging 10–15% per year (Card, 2001; Goldin & Katz,
8; Oreopolous & Petronijevic, 2013). The vast majority
he research in this area has focused on high school and
r-year colleges: few studies identify the returns to two-
r colleges (Ashenfelter, Harmon, & Oosterbeek, 1999a,
9b; Oreopolous & Petronijevic, 2013).
Of the handful of studies examining returns to
ociate’s degrees and two-year colleges, most focus
lusively on public community colleges. Reviewing the
rature on community college returns, Kane and Rouse
99) find that a year of community college attendance
erates returns between 5 and 8%, just marginally below
 average return to a four-year college attendance.
dents who complete associate’s degrees earn 15–27%
re than observationally similar individuals with no
tsecondary education.
Central to the literature on returns is a debate over the
uracy of various methods to identify the causal effect of
cation on earnings. Students who pursue additional
cation are likely to differ on both observable and
bservable dimensions from those who do not. If these
erences are correlated with subsequent earnings, cross-
tional estimates of the returns to schooling will be
sed. While a number of studies of high school and four-
r college returns have attempted to address this
ogeneity problem using natural experiments and
ing comparisons, few studies in the community college
rature have implemented similar identification strate-
s. Many studies estimate cross-sectional models com-
ing students attending community college to those who
not, generally controlling for ability with proxies, such
Q scores (for example, Grubb, 1993, 1995; Heineman &
sna, 1977; Kane & Rouse, 1995; Leigh & Gill 1997;
nk-Turner, 1994; Marcotte, Bailey, Borkoski, & Kienzl,
5).
Recent studies on the returns to community college
cation have implemented stronger identification strat-
es. Jacobson et al. (2005) and Jepsen et al. (in press) use
individual- or person-specific fixed effects approach
paring the wages of students before and after they
nd a public community college, thereby controlling for
e-invariant individual characteristics that may bias
ss-sectional estimates. Among displaced workers in
shington State, Jacobson et al. (2005) find returns of 9%
 year of education for men and 13% for women, with
ch higher returns to quantitative and technically
nted vocational coursework than less-quantitative
rsework in the humanities, social sciences, and basic
ls. Among all community college students in Kentucky,
associate’s degree for women and 24% for men completing
degrees.
We know of very few studies that attempt to assess the
returns to for-profit postsecondary education. Most rely on
cross-sectional variation in earnings, comparing students
who attend for-profit institutions with students who
attend other types of postsecondary institutions to
estimate the differential returns to the for-profit sector.
In a working paper, Chung (2008) instruments for college
choice using tuition and concentration of community
colleges. Along with Grubb (1993),3 Chung finds limited
evidence of positive effects of for-profit training, particu-
larly for women and certificate programs, but generally
shows no significant differences in returns to the for-profit
students relative to students in other sectors. Deming et al.
(2012), Lang and Weinstein (2012) and Lang and
Weinstein (2013)4 draw on the Beginning Postsecondary
Student (BPS) data along with OLS and propensity score
methods. Deming et al. (2012) estimate the differential
return to for-profits compared to other postsecondary
institutions finding that for-profit students (in all types of
degree programs) earn about 8% less than observationally
similar students in other sectors, but differences are
smaller and not significant when conditioning on employ-
ment. In contrast, Lang and Weinstein (2013) find that
annual income is at least 20% higher for students beginning
associate’s degrees in for-profits relative to other sectors.
They attribute this finding to the fact that more students in
public and not-for-profit institutions go on to obtain
bachelor’s degrees, so students with only an associate’s
degree in the public and non-profit sector are negatively
selected.
In the only other working paper (that we know of) to
use panel data, Turner (2012) implements the same
identification strategy using tax data. Although he is
unable to identify students’ degree program in his data, he
finds that for-profit college students in two-year institu-
tions earn about a 2% return, conditional on employment.
Public and non-profit students fare better, gaining about
6%.
In our study we estimate the impact of for-profit college
education on earnings using an individual fixed effects
approach, and we use this approach to study the return to
for-profit associate’s programs specifically. By comparing
the before and after wages for the same individual, our
fixed effects approach mitigates some of the most critical
endogeneity problems that plague cross-sectional studies
of the for-profit sector.5
3 Note that a related paper (Grubb, 1993b), using the same data and
methods to estimate returns to community colleges was found to be
severely flawed by Kane and Rouse (1995b).
4 Lang and Weinstein (2013) is an update of their 2012 working paper
using BPS transcript data, rather than BPS survey data. We report results
from the 2013 version.
5 This approach has also been used in the broader labor economics
literature. For example, Ashenfelter (1978) and Angrist and Newey (1991)
use individual fixed effects to assess the impact of job training programs
on earnings. Angrist and Newey (1991) and Freeman (1984) examine theact of union status on earnings. See Angrist and Kreuger (1999, chap.
for an overview of the fixed effects strategy in labor economics.sen et al. (in press) find higher returns – 56% for an
imp
23) 
S.R. Cellini, L. Chaudhary / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 125–1401283. Background
Our paper estimates the returns for students enrolled in
associate’s degree programs in for-profit institutions.
Associate’s degree programs typically require two years
of full-time coursework and result in the attainment of an
Associate of Arts (AA) or Associate of Science (AS) degree.6
Students may obtain their degree in any number of majors,
including traditional liberal arts and science majors like
history, psychology, or computer science, as well as more
vocational fields such as medical assisting, paralegal
studies, or homeland security.
For-profit institutions that award associate’s degrees
are classified as two-year or four-year institutions by the
U.S. Department of Education, based on the highest degree
that they offer. For example, many of the large for-profit
chains such as University of Phoenix or DeVry University
offer both associate’s and bachelor’s degree programs,
designating them as four-year institutions. Two-year
colleges offer associate’s degrees as their highest degrees,
such as the Heald College chain along with many smaller
local colleges. Interestingly, of the roughly 194,000
students obtaining associate’s degrees from for-profits,
65% of students receive them from institutions that also
offer bachelor’s degrees (National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES), 2012). We include students pursuing
associate’s degrees in both sets of institutions in our
analysis.7
As noted above, for-profits account for 21% of the
associate’s degrees conferred, while the vast majority of
associate’s degrees are conferred by public community
colleges (74%). In contrast to the market for bachelor’s
degrees where not-for-profits dominate the private sector,
not-for-profit institutions confer just 5% of associate’s
degree (National Center for Education Statistics (NCES),
2012). In this analysis, we drop students pursuing
associate’s degrees in public and non-profit institutions
and focus exclusively on generating the absolute return to
enrollment in a for-profit institution relative to students
who graduate from high school, but do not receive any
college degree.8
Research on for-profit colleges is scarce, in part due to the
fact that, until recently, very few publicly available data
sources included for-profit institutions and students. Most
studies of for-profit colleges examine only federal aid-
eligible for-profits that participate in the U.S. Department of
Education’s Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Sys-
tem (IPEDS)andmostare descriptiveinnature(Apling,1993;
Bailey, Badway, & Gumport, 2001; Chung, 2012; Deming
et al., 2012; Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, & Person, 2006;
Turner, 2006, chap. 3).9 Administrative licensing data has
added to our knowledge of these institutions in recent years
and allowed for causal studies of institutional behavior
(Cellini, 2009, 2010) and a more accurate count of institu-
tions(Cellini&Goldin, inpress),but inspiteoftheseadvances
surprisingly little is knownaboutfor-profit colleges and their
students.
What we have learned from these studies and data
sources is that there are approximately 7500 for-profit
institutions in the Unites States, at any level i.e., two-year,
four-year, or less-than-two-year, about 3000 of which are
eligible for federal student aid programs (Cellini & Goldin,
in press). Due to the nature of our data, we focus on aid-
eligible institutions in this analysis. Average enrollment in
aid-eligible for-profits is just 500 students, a figure that
pales in comparison to public community colleges that
average about 7000 students each nationwide (National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES), 2012).
Research on the sub-baccalaureate market has empha-
sized the similarities and differences between for-profits
and community colleges. Cellini (2009) shows that for-
profits and community colleges compete for students:
when funding for community colleges increases, for-profit
colleges exit the market. Similarly, Chung (2012) finds that
community college tuition positively impacts the proba-
bility of attending a for-profit college. Both sectors also
offer a wide range of overlapping degree programs (Cellini,
2009), but community colleges tend to offer more
academic and liberal arts programs and for-profits often
specialize in vocational fields in which skills are easy to
verify and physical plant requirements are modest (Turner,
2006, chap. 3). Both offer a large number of part-time,
evening, and online programs to meet the needs of
working students (Rosenbaum, Deil-Amen, & Person,
2006), but some notable differences in student character-
istics remain.
Deming et al. (2012) report that, relative to community
colleges, for-profit institutions (including aid-eligible two-
year and four-year institutions) enroll a higher proportion
of women (65 versus 57%), blacks (22 versus 14%), GED
recipients (17 versus 10%), and single parents (29 versus
12%). Income differences are also substantial: the average
income of a for-profit student is roughly $15,000–20,000
less than a community college student. The most impor-
tant difference between for-profit and public two-year
colleges is undoubtedly their price: required tuition and
fees for public community colleges average just $2650 for
in-state students, while for-profit two-year colleges
charge more than five times as much, averaging $14,000
6 We cannot differentiate between these degrees in our data.
7 We find no differences between the returns to associate’s degrees in
two- versus four-year for-profit institutions, see Table 5.
8 A previous version of this paper emphasized estimates of the
differential return to for-profits relative to public community colleges.
Since we found we had little power to detect differences between the
sectors, in this paper, we focus more specifically on the absolute returns
to for-profits relative to high school graduates with no college degree.
9 The IPEDS undercounts the total number of for-profit colleges in the
U.S. because it excludes those that do not participate in federal student
aid programs. In fact, for many years the IPEDS did not accurately track
nor require the participation of any for-profit institutions. Since about
2000, all institutions participating in federal student aid programs have
been required to complete the IPEDS survey, but for-profits that do not
participate in federal aid programs are still not required to participate and
remain largely unaccounted for in the data. Only about 200 of an
estimated 4500 non-aid-eligible institution voluntarily respond to the
IPEDS (see Cellini & Goldin, in press). Further, these institutions areHowever, we include an estimate of the differential effect of public sector
institutions as a robustness check in Table 5.
typically not assigned an identification number that allows merging onto
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ES), 2012, Table 381).10
Of course, students at for-profit institutions receive a
roportionate share of federal student aid to pay for
ir education. For-profit students account for 24% of all
eral Pell grant aid, 26% of student loan disbursements,
 36% of Post 9–11 GI Bill benefits, while enrolling just
 of all students (Deming et al., 2012). In two-year for-
fit colleges, a full 90% of students receive some kind of
. Of those who receive aid, for-profit two-year college
dents average $4350 in federal grants and $7750 in
eral loans (National Center for Education Statistics
ES), 2012). Student loan default rates are remarkably
h in the for-profit sector: two-year cohort default rates
 12.5%, while the 10-year cumulative rate (based on
ber of loans rather than students) is 35% (U.S.
artment of Education, 2011).
In light of the financial burden placed on both students
 taxpayer, we should expect that the earnings gains from
ndance would be positive for the average student.
ether the gain is enough to offset the high cost of
ndance is an issue we explore in our conclusions below.
mpirical methods
Many studies of the returns to education estimate
ss-sectional regression models following Mincer
74). The main concern with such estimates is the
ential endogeneity of attendance because individuals
re likely to earn higher earnings may also be more likely
attend college, resulting in biased estimates of the
rns to education.
To address this endogeneity problem, our research
ign exploits the panel structure of the NLSY97 data.
ike high school and traditional four-year college
dents, associate’s degree students (and particularly
se in for-profit colleges) often work before, during, and
r attendance. We can therefore add individual-level
d effects to the Mincer model, exploiting the variation
arnings for the same individual before and after she
nds a for-profit college. This strategy effectively
trols for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity at
 student level, though other types of selection may
ain (we return to this point below).
Our treatment group is the sample of for-profit college
dents who report working towards or receiving an
ociate’s degree in our period of study (1997–2010). Our
in estimates therefore reflect the return to for-profit
ndance, rather than degree completion. They can be
rpreted as the average gain in earnings that students
erience after enrolling in a for-profit institution regard-
 ofwhetheror nottheygraduate. Webelievetheseare the
st useful estimates for policy analysis, since they indicate
 average outcome we can expect for a student who enrolls
 for-profit associate’s degree program. As a robustness
ck, we also estimate the earnings gains to degree
completion. However, it is important to note that graduates
are a select sample of for-profit students and are likely not
representative of the average student’s experience. Further,
completion is an outcome and is therefore endogenous. That
is, many factors may jointly influence whether an individual
completes their associate’s degree at a for-profit college and
their subsequent earnings, making it difficult to discern
causal effects for this group.
We construct a control group that includes high school
graduates who never report working toward an associate’s
degree in the time period we observe to better identify the
absolute returns to for-profit attendance beyond high
school. We construct a falsified post-education variable for
this ‘‘high school only’’ group.11 Therefore, our estimates of
returns to for-profit colleges can be thought of as
difference-in-difference estimates: the first difference is
between high school graduates with no college degree and
for-profit students, and the second difference is the pre-
versus post-education (or falsified post-education) earn-
ings for each individual.
We estimate log weekly earnings and other employ-
ment outcomes, yict, for individual i in county c and year t
as a function of for-profit college attendance and individual
characteristics as follows:
yict ¼ b0 þ b1ðPostitÞ þ b2ðPostit  ForProfitiÞ þ gXit þ dct
þ tt þ hi þ eict
The variable Postit identifies the post-education time
period for each student. It switches from 0 to 1 the year after
an individual reports receiving an associate’s degree (for
degree completers) and the year after an individual last
reports working towards an associate’s degree (for dropouts).
It then remains 1 in all subsequent years. For the high school
only group the falsified Postit is based on age, as described in
the next section. We interact this variable with ForProfiti, an
indicator for whether the individual attended a for-profit
college. The result is that the variable of interest Postit * For-
Profitiequals1 for for-profitcollege students ineachyearafter
attendance or degree completion and 0 otherwise.
To control for time-varying factors that may jointly
influence for-profit college attendance and earnings, we
include a variety of controls in Xit. Specifically, we add age
fixed effects, interactions of the age fixed effects with both
race and gender, an indicator for the years in which
individuals are enrolled in college, and an indicator for the
two years before college for the for-profit students. We
discuss the reasons for each of these controls below. We
also include a time trend for each individual’s county of
residence, dct, to proxy for changes in local labor market
conditions and for-profit college supply. We include year
fixed effects, tt, to capture changes in the macro-economic
climate influencing all individuals in the same manner.
Most importantly, we add indicators for each individ-
ual, hi. These individual fixed effects control for time-
invariant unobservable characteristics that are correlated
both with earnings and the decision to attend a for-profit
The average for for-profits include only federal aid-eligible institu-
11s of the type we examine here. For-profits that are not aid eligible
ge about 78% less (Cellini & Goldin, in press).
We refer to this group as both the ‘‘high school only’’ and ‘‘high school
graduates’’ group throughout.
S.R. Cellini, L. Chaudhary / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 125–140130institution. In the case of for-profit associate’s degree
students, a student’s innate ability and motivation are the
primary omitted variables we should be concerned about.
To the extent that these do not change over time, our fixed
effects will provide adequate controls for these potentially
confounding omitted variables. The key identifying as-
sumption of the fixed effects approach is that conditional
on observables, nothing else that affects earnings changes
contemporaneously with college attendance. However,
this assumption can breakdown and bias estimates of the
returns to a for-profit education in two primary ways.
First, our sample consists of young workers that may
exhibit changing labor force attachment over the age-range
we observe. We deal with this issue in several ways. Our
county-year trends and the controls interacting age fixed
effects with race and sex help mitigate this bias, allowing for
flexible trends in earnings for different groups. Our indicator
for the years in college accounts for the opportunity cost of
attendance, since students likely need to cut back on hours
or give up working completely while in college. We also
restrict our analysis to person-year observations over age
18 to avoid capturing earnings from informal jobs such as
babysitting. Finally, as a robustness check, we limit the
sample to individuals with valid earnings data in the pre-
period, as is common in the job-training literature.
Second, we worry about biases associated with the
dynamic selection of individuals into college. In particular,
estimates of returns may be biased upwards if individuals
experience a decline in earnings in the years immediately
preceding enrollment. This issue, sometimes referred to as
‘‘Ashenfelter’s dip,’’ is well-known in the job training
literature, as individuals with negative earnings shocks are
more likely to enroll in training than individuals in untreated
control groups.12This typeofdip would causeour estimateof
the returns to for-profits to overstate the true gain. To
address such concerns, we include an indicator variable for
the two years before attendance for the for-profit students.
5. Data
To implement our analysis, we draw on the restricted-
access 1997 panel of the National Longitudinal Survey of
Youth (NLSY97), a major nationally representative longitu-
dinal survey that tracks a cohort of students through
secondary school, college, and beyond. The NLSY97 is based
on a panel of 8984 youths who were 12–18 years old when
theywerefirstsurveyedin1997.13Theyouthsareinterviewed
each year and we use data available through 2010. We thus
have a group of individuals ranging from age 25 to 31 by 2010.
The NLSY97 has both advantages and disadvantages
relative to other datasets. On the down side, it is a young
and relatively small cohort of individuals. Less than 1% of
the individuals are in their 30s by 2010 and we have a
small sample of individuals to draw from who enroll in
associate’s degree programs in for-profit colleges. Many
for-profit colleges offer certificates and diplomas, but these
are not well documented in the education module of the
NLSY97 so we are unable to estimate the returns to non-
degree programs in for-profit colleges.14
On the up side, the NLSY97 is a panel with rich
information on the education and earnings trajectory of
individuals. Most importantly, it surveys individuals
annually for 14 years, allowing us to implement an
individual fixed effects estimation that gets closer than
OLS and propensity score estimates to identifying the
causal effect of education on earnings, as described above.
But it has several other advantages as well. It contains
detailed data on weekly wages and hours for multiple jobs
each year, allowing us a more accurate estimate of earning
gains than many other surveys. The restricted access data
also contains county of residence in each year and allows
us to merge the NLSY97 with the IPEDS to accurately
identify an individual’s college. Overall, we believe the
panel structure and detailed information on education and
earnings outweigh the disadvantages of the NLSY97 for
this type of analysis.
Our main sample is restricted to individuals who report
working towards or receiving an associate’s degree at a for-
profit college (the treatment group) and a control group of
individuals who have graduated from high school but never
report working towards or receiving an associate’s degree.
We drop individuals who received a bachelor’s degree or
have completed 16 or more years of education from both
groups, since we observe very few post-education years for
these individuals. However, we leave in students who at
some point may report working towards (but not obtaining)
a bachelor’s degree, as a sizable proportion of students at
for-profit colleges who on occasion state they are working
towards a bachelor’s degree also report pursuing or
obtaining an associate’s degree.15 Since students who drop
out of traditional bachelor’s degree programs in not-for-
profit or public institutions might be positively selected vis-
a`-vis for-profit students, we perform robustness checks
dropping these students from the high school only group.
Our final sample includes 388 for-profit students and
2303 individuals in the high school only control group.
We focus on associate’s degree students in the for-profit
sector for several reasons. First, as noted above, for-profits
offer a disproportionate share of associate’s degrees, so
focusing on these students allows us a large enough
sample size to identify absolute returns. Second, the
individual fixed effects approach requires earnings before
and after attendance, and most students in associate’s
degree programs work before attending college, but this is
not typically the case with ‘‘traditional’’ bachelor’s degree
students. We observe earnings for 72% of our for-profit
12 See Ashenfelter (1978), Ashenfelter and Card (1985), and Heckman
and Hotz (1989) for more discussion.
13 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics website, individuals
surveyed in the NLSY97 were 12–16 years of age as of December 31,
1996. We report the age in the survey year. For example, a majority of the
14 The NLSY97 collects information on certificates as part of the job
training module, but we do not believe these can be matched to IPEDS
college codes.
15 About 40% of for-profit associate’s degree students also report
working toward a bachelor’s degree at some point in time. We believeindividuals (94%) are documented as 12–16 in the 1997 survey year, 6%
are 17 years old and 12 individuals are 18 years old.
that many of these students aspire to a bachelor’s degree, but end up
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 post-education period.
 Measuring for-profit attendance
The two key variables in our analysis are indicators for
t-education and whether an individual attended a for-
fit college. To construct a consistent measure of post-
cation, we code Postit as 1 only when we are certain that
ividuals are out of college. In the case of associate’s
ree graduates, Postit switches to 1 the year after they
ort receiving their degree and remains 1 for all
sequent years.16 For dropouts (i.e., attendees who do
 complete a degree in the time period we observe), we
 self-reported information on whether they are
rking towards an associate’s degree’’ to code post-
cation. 76% of dropouts at for-profit colleges report
rking towards their associate’s degree for a few years
 never report working towards an associate’s degree
in. For this group, we switch Postit to 1 the year
owing the last time they report working towards an
ociate’s degree.
We also observe individuals who work towards an
ociate’s degree for a few years, then drop out (i.e., do not
ort working towards an associate’s degree) and report
rking towards an associate’ degree again after a few
rs before dropping out again. For these ‘‘double
pouts’’, we switch Postit to 1 the year following the
 observed enrollment and all the years before are
ted as 0.17 Finally, we have 47 individuals attending
profit colleges who are still working towards their
ociate’s degree in 2010. We leave these individuals in
 sample but they do not contribute to identification.
To identify students attending a for-profit institution
 use the sector of the college as listed in the IPEDS. We
arately identify two-year and four-year for-profits as a
ustness check. Since colleges are listed every year, for
ree completers, we use the IPEDS college code in the
r that they graduate to identify them as for-profit
dents. For dropouts, we use the college listed in the last
erved year of enrollment.18
For the high school only group, we create a falsified
Postit that turns on at age 23, which is the average age of
students in the NLSY97 the first year after their last
observed enrollment in an associate’s degree program (for
dropouts) and the first year after they complete an
associate’s degree (for graduates).19 We also create a
falsified in-school variable assuming the high school only
group are in college for two years before their post-
education period begins.
5.2. Dependent variables and controls
Following the returns literature (e.g., Angrist & Kreuger,
1991), our main dependent variable is the natural log of
weekly earnings, where weekly earnings are calculated as
the product of the individual’s hourly wage and average
hours worked per week. In the NLSY97, individuals report
their wages and hours for up to eleven jobs in a year, but
the number of people reporting wages for more than five
jobs is less than 1%. Hence, we focus on average weekly
earnings across the first five jobs.20 There are a few clear
outliers in the average wage and hours worked per week
variables that we use to calculate weekly earnings. We
drop person-year observations where the average hourly
wage across the first five jobs is less than $1 or greater than
$100, and where the hours worked per week is greater than
160.21
As noted above, we also limit our analysis to person-
year observations where individuals are 18 years or older
to avoid capturing wages in informal early jobs.22 Since the
NLSY97 is a young cohort, we observe earnings for
3.4 years on average in the post-education period (3.6 years
for for-profit students and 3.4 years for high school
graduates). Our estimates of returns are thus estimates of
the short run returns to for-profit colleges and may
underestimate returns if earnings are more responsive in
the long run.
Using the natural log of weekly earnings as the
dependent variable has some advantages and drawbacks.
First, observations with zero or missing earnings data are
dropped from the analysis: our estimates therefore reflect
returns conditional on employment. These estimates are
comparable to previous estimates of returns in other
sectors and can be interpreted as percentage changes,
however, they do not capture whether or not for-profit
students are more likely to be employed than high school
graduates with no college.
The NLSY97 has many variables to identify degree completion. We
the most inclusive set of variables (highest degree received, highest
ee received ever, and type of degree received since date of last
rview) to identify degree completion. Our results are robust to using
 a subset of these variables to identify degree completion. We also
te an indicator variable for years in college based on self-reported
rmation. Ten percent of for-profit students who eventually obtain an
ciate’s degree never report working towards an associate’s degree.
this group, we assume they were in college for two years before
iving their degree.
Among dropouts, 17% of individuals attending for-profits dropout
e and 2% dropout three times.
The NLSY97 lists up to five colleges per year per student, but the vast
ority (85%) of students list only one in the year of graduation or of last
rved enrollment. As long as at least one college is for-profit in the
 of graduation or the year of last observed enrollment, we code the
ent as for-profit. We drop students who also report attending
itutions in the public sector in the same year as a robustness check in
e 5. Finally, for a few individuals, the IPEDS code is missing in the year
19 The comparable average age of post-education for the sample of for-
profit students is 23.7 and our results are robust to using this age for the
high school only group. However, we prefer to use the average age of all
associate’s degree students (23) due to concerns about endogeneity.
20 The results are robust to alternate definitions of weekly earnings
based on the first job alone and all reported jobs. We show the latter result
in Table 5.
21 The results are robust to keeping these outliers in the analysis. The $1
average wage cut-off is below the 1 percentile of the wage distribution
($2.08) and $100 is above the 99 percentile of the wage distribution
($62.5). Since there are 168 total hours in a week, reports of individualsraduation or the year of last observed enrollment. We use the IPEDS
 from the previous year to code for-profit in these instances.
working more than 160 are also clear outliers.
22 Our results are robust to including individuals 16 and over.
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understand our estimates of returns, we therefore also
examine several other labor market outcomes. We first
decompose weekly earnings to estimate the effects of for-
profit attendance on log hourly wages and log hours
worked per week across the first five jobs. We also
estimate the effects of for-profit attendance on full-time
employment and any employment, this time including
observations with zero earnings.23 Our measure of full-
time employment equals one if an individual reports
working 35 or more hours per week, and our indicator for
any employment equals one if an individual reports non-
zero weekly earnings. Finally, we report unconditional
estimates of returns, using weekly earnings in dollars as
the dependent variable and again including observations
with zero earnings. These estimates combine both the
earnings gains and employment effects of for-profit
attendance.
As noted above, in addition to individual fixed effects,
we include age fixed effects, calendar year fixed effects, a
dummy for when individuals are in school and flexible
controls for observable characteristics by interacting age
fixed effects with dummies for both race and sex. We also
interact the 1997 county of residence from the geo-coded
portion of the NLSY97 (restricted access) with time
trends to control for changing local labor market
conditions. We believe the 1997 county of residence,
the first year of the survey, is the most exogenous
measure of location. As a robustness check, we also
interact the county of residence in the year before an
individual begins college.24
5.3. Summary statistics
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the main
variables used in our analysis. We present the means
separately for the for-profit sample and for the high school
only group. Our for-profit sample consists of 388 individu-
als of which 43% received an associate’s degree by 2010. On
average, for-profit students are more likely to be female
(57%) and non-white (63%), as found in previous research
(Deming et al., 2012).25 The average weekly earnings
during the entire time period are slightly lower for the for-
profit sample compared to our high school sample ($371
versus $384), but this is probably related to the larger
proportion of males in the latter group. Although
employment rates are similar for both groups, individuals
from for-profits are less likely to be employed full time
over the 1997–2010 period at 49% compared to 54% for
high school graduates.
To visually examine the time patterns of earnings, we
graph the raw mean of log weekly earnings for each group
five years before and after post-education in Fig. 1. Year
0 is the first post-education year and on average, students
enter college 2.6 years earlier, where the dashed line
appears. Note that for-profit students appear to have only
a very slight advantage over high school graduates in the
post-education period. More noticeable is the dip in
earnings for for-profit students prior to enrollment that
does not appear to occur for the high school group. As
noted above, we include controls for the two years prior to
enrollment to control for this difference. We next turn to
the results to see if these visual post-education gains
stand up to regression analysis.
6. Results
6.1. Main results
Table 2 presents our first set of findings on log weekly
earnings. Specifications (1) and (2) are cross-sectional OLS
models common in the literature, while specifications (3)
through (5) are our preferred estimates, exploiting within-
individual variation by including individual fixed effects.
The first row of Table 2 finds small and statistically
insignificant effects of post-education (Postit) in every
specification. This result is expected because Postit is
falsified for the high school only group, so they should see
no jump in earnings at age 23 in the absence of further
education. More importantly, in the second row of Table 2
we find a significant effect of for-profit college attendance
on weekly earnings across all specifications. Cross-
sectional OLS estimates in specification (1) suggest a
significant return to for-profit attendance of 13.6% over
Table 1
Summary statistics, NLSY 1997.
Variable For-profit students HS graduates
Mean Std dev Mean Std dev
Weekly earnings ($) $371.23 $276.68 $384.43 $278.30
Hourly wage $10.94 $7.16 $11.14 $7.48
Hours worked per
week
33.8 10.0 34.7 10.5
Full time employment 49.1% 50.0% 53.7% 49.9%
Any employment 87.4% 33.2% 86.1% 34.6%
Age 22.7 3.1 22.8 3.1
Male 42.9% 49.5% 58.3% 49.3%
White (non-Hispanic) 37.3% 48.4% 46.1% 49.8%
Black (non-Hispanic) 36.5% 48.1% 29.1% 45.4%
Asian 0.7% 8.4% 0.9% 9.4%
Hispanic 10.8% 31.1% 11.5% 31.9%
Other 14.7% 35.4% 12.4% 33.0%




Note: Statistics are person-year averages from 1997 to 2010 for
individuals age 18 and older. Weekly earnings, average hourly wage, and
hours worked per week are conditional on employment (i.e., zeros not
included). Any employment and full time employment count individuals
with zero earnings as unemployed.
23 The NLSY97 codes five types of missing variables – refusals, do not
know, invalid skips, valid skips, and non-interviews. In the NLSY97, if a
person is not working, they are coded as a valid skip. We therefore recode
observations with valid skips in both wages and hours as having zero
earnings. In our baseline sample, 8134 person-year observations (30%)
are missing of which 3072 (11%) are valid skips.
24 Dropping the county-year trend does not affect our results, as shown
in Table 2, column (3).
25 We constructed the race variable incorporating information on both






























S.R. Cellini, L. Chaudhary / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 125–140 133h school graduates.26 As we add more controls
ecification 2) and the individual fixed effects (specifica-
s 3–5), the coefficients on Postit * ForProfiti decrease
htly in magnitude but not statistical significance. Our
ferred fully loaded individual fixed effects specification
(5), which includes both the county of residence trends and
the pre-education indicator finds a statistically significant
10.3% return to for-profit college attendance relative to
high school graduates with no college degree.
Since the for-profit associate’s degree students in our
sample attend college for an average of 2.6 years, dividing
our estimated returns by this figure yields a measure of
returns to a single year of education that can be more easily
compared to previous studies. Based on this calculation,
for-profit associate’s degree programs yield a 4% increase
in earnings per year of education. This estimate is slightly


















For-Profit For-Profit 95% CI
High School High School 95% CI
Dashed vertical line at -2.6 denotes average year of college entry for for-profit students.
Fig. 1. Unadjusted log weekly earnings over time.
le 2
rns to for-profit attendance, log weekly earnings.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
st-Education 0.026 0.021 0.010 0.011 0.012
[0.035] [0.035] [0.033] [0.033] [0.033]
st-Educ * For-Profit 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.110*** 0.104*** 0.103***
[0.036] [0.036] [0.035] [0.036] [0.037]
mographics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
unty of residence trend No Yes No Yes Yes
dividual FE No No Yes Yes Yes
henfelter’s Dip No No No No Yes
servations 19,364 19,364 19,364 19,364 19,364
dividuals 2627 2627 2627
ust standard errors clustered at the individual level in brackets. Note: Post-education is an indicator variable that turns on at age 23 for the high school
p (falsified post), the year after graduation for the for-profit degree completers and the year after the last observed enrollment for the for-profit
outs. For-Profit is an indicator variable for individuals who attended an associate’s degree program or received an associate’s degree from a for-profit
ge. Demographics include age fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects * race, age fixed effects * male, and an indicator for the years when
viduals are in college. County of residence is an individual’s county of residence in 1997, the first year of the survey. Ashenfelter’s dip is an indicator
able for the two-years before for-profit students begin college.
 0.1.
 0.05.
* p < 0.01.
We report our findings as percentages, but they are actually log
ts. To convert log points to percentages use (eˆlog points)  1. But note
 this transformation has virtually no impact on the interpretation for
points below 0.30 (as we report here) so, for simplicity, we describe
 as percentages throughout.
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than the returns to a year of public community college
attendance reported by Jacobson et al. (2005) (9–13% per
year). Our estimates remain even slightly below the 5–8%
range found for public community college students in
cross-sectional studies in the 1980s and 1990s as reported
by Kane and Rouse (1999).
To explore the dynamic pattern of earnings gains in
more detail, we implement a type of event-study analysis.
We add interactions of ForProfit with each pre- and post-
education year within a three-year window and plot the
coefficients and confidence intervals in Fig. 2.28 As
expected, our results are significant only in the post
period (0 is the first post-education year) and there is a
slight growth in earnings over time after attendance. In the
fourth year post-education, earnings gains grow to 15%, or
about a 5.8% return per year.
In Table 3, we explore the effect of for-profit enrollment
on employment and other labor market outcomes using
our preferred fully loaded individual fixed effects specifi-
cation (specification (5) in Table 2). For comparison, we
show the results on log weekly earnings in specification
(1). The results in specifications (2) and (3) suggest that the
positive returns to for-profit enrollment are driven mostly
by higher hourly wages (6.8% higher than high school
graduates) rather than higher hours worked per week
(3.6% higher than high school graduates but statistically
insignificant). Specifications (4) and (5) are linear proba-
bility models for employment, now including observations
with zero earnings. We find that attending a for-profit
college increases the probability of full-time employment
relative to high school graduates by 6.4 percentage points.
In specification (5), we also find a marginally significant
positive effect of for-profit college attendance on any
employment, but this effect is only significant at the 10%
level.
Finally, in specification (6), we analyze unconditional
weekly earnings by moving away from the log specifica-
tion and including the zeros in weekly earnings. The
coefficient on Post * ForProfit suggests for-profit students
earn $58 per week more than high school graduates, an
increase of 17.6% over the average weekly earnings of for-
profit students.29 Dividing by 2.6, the unconditional return
to a year of education in a for-profit college is about 7%.
Since the unconditional returns conflate employment
outcomes and earnings gains, it is perhaps unsurprising
that we find slightly larger returns to unconditional
earnings than conditional returns since for-profit college
attendance may increase the probability of full time
employment, as shown in column (4).
6.2. Robustness checks
Table 4 reports the results of several alternate
specifications and robustness checks. In our main speci-
fications (Table 3) we dropped person-year observations
where average hourly wages across the first five jobs were
less than $1 or greater than $100. While it is possible that
























-4 -2 0 2 4
Years Since Post-Education
Coefficient on For-Profit 95% CI
Coefficient estimates from a single regression that interacts Post*For-Profit with each year pre- and
post-education.
Fig. 2. Dynamic returns to for-profit attendance.
27 The difference might be explained by the fact that Turner’s sample
includes students pursuing certificates and diplomas as well as associate’s
degrees in two-year institutions.
28 This regression includes age FE, year FE, age FE * race, age FE * male,
individual FE, county of residence trends, and an indicator for the two
years before for-profit students enroll in college. Instead of an indicator
for when students are in college, we include the main effects for each pre-and post-education year within the three-year window and their
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h percentile of the average hourly wage distribution for
 sample. So, in specification (2) of Table 4, we drop
son-year observations where the average hourly wage
elow the 1st percentile ($2.08) and above the 99th
centile ($62.5) of the distribution. For comparison we
ort the estimates from our preferred fully loaded FE in
cification 1 (from Table 2, specification 5). The results in
cification (2) are only slightly higher indicating a return
1.1% to for-profit colleges.30
Specification (3) uses earnings from all reported jobs
 to eleven each year), rather than the first five. The
ults are very close to our baseline, at 10.4%. We find
similar results when we rely only on the first reported job
for our measure of earnings (not reported).
As noted above, our baseline estimates include several
controls to address potential biases created by the
changing labor force attachment of young workers. We
add one additional robustness check here. Specification (4)
uses the presence of non-missing earnings data in the pre-
education period as a selection criterion. We restrict the
sample to individuals who were employed in each of the
three consecutive years prior to enrolling in college.
Despite losing 1223 individuals, our estimates remain
very similar to the full sample, suggesting that for-profit
students earn 10.4% over high school graduates.
A small proportion of our for-profit sample consists of
individuals who dropout and re-enroll multiple times. In
our baseline specification, our definition of post-education
le 3
cts of for-profit college attendance on labor market outcomes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Wkly Earn Log Hrly Wages Log Hrs/Week FT Employ Any Employ Wkly Earn ($)
st-Education 0.012 0.012 0.022 0.013 0.014 3.736
[0.033] [0.025] [0.022] [0.029] [0.020] [13.851]
st-Educ * For-Profit 0.103*** 0.068** 0.036 0.064** 0.034* 58.006***
[0.037] [0.027] [0.026] [0.029] [0.019] [15.667]
servations 19,364 19,364 19,364 22,436 22,436 22,436
dividuals 2627 2627 2627 2672 2672 2672
bust standard errors clustered at the individual level in brackets.
: All regressions include age fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects * race, age fixed effects * male, an indicator for the years when individuals
in college, a county of residence trend, and an indicator for the two years before for-profit students begin college. Specifications (4) and (5) are linear
ability models that include individuals with valid zero earnings. In specification (6) the dependent variable is the unconditional weekly earnings (in
ars), including individuals with valid zero earnings. See Table 2 and the text for descriptions of the Post-Education and Post-Education * For-Profit
ables.
p < 0.1.
 p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.
le 4
ustness checks, log weekly earnings.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
st-Education 0.012 0.022 0.012 0.040 0.016 0.004
[0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.046] [0.036] [0.033]
st-Educ * For-Profit 0.103*** 0.111*** 0.104*** 0.104** 0.121*** 0.097***































servations 19,364 19,240 19,364 12,567 19,364 19,364
dividuals 2627 2624 2627 1404 2627 2627
bust standard errors clustered at the individual level in brackets.
: All regressions include age fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects * race, age fixed effects * male, an indicator for the years when individuals
n college, a county of residence trend, and an indicator for the two years before for-profit students begin college. See Table 2 and the text for descriptions
e Post-Education and Post-Education * For-Profit variables. Please refer to the text and notes below each specification for specific changes.
 0.1
 p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.
Our estimates are also robust to including the outliers.
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individuals, but this may be too restrictive if these
individuals enroll for just a few weeks after the first or
second dropout before deciding to quit again. In specifica-
tion (5) we use an alternate definition of post-education for
‘‘double dropouts’’ that switches to one when we first
observe them drop out. For associate’s degree holders and
individuals who only dropout once, Post is defined as
before. The coefficient is marginally bigger using this
alternate definition of post-education suggesting for-
profits earn 12% over high school graduates.
Finally, specification (6) uses the county of residence in
the year before individuals enroll in college to construct the
county of residence trend, rather than the county in 1997 as
in our baseline specification. Unlike the 1997 county of
residence, which is typically a parental decision, county of
residence immediately prior to enrollment may be endog-
enous to the schooling decision. On the other hand, it may
better capture changes in local labor markets relevant to
young adults. The estimated returns to for-profits are
robust to this alternate county of residence trend at 9.7%.
6.3. Heterogeneous effects and alternate samples
In Table 5, we test for heterogeneous effects and
estimate the returns to for-profit college attendance using
several different samples. Again, we report the estimates
from our preferred FE specification in column 1 for
comparison. As noted in the background section, individ-
or four-year for-profit institution. In our sample, 53% of
individuals attend or receive their associate’s degree from
a four-year for-profit institution. We find no evidence of a
differential return to four-year for-profit colleges in
specification (2). The coefficient on the four-year interac-
tion is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. 31
In all of our prior estimates, we combine individuals
who complete associate’s degrees with those who do not
because degree completion is endogenous. However, the
returns to attendance are likely higher for completers than
for dropouts. We therefore test for differential effects by
degree completion in specification (3) in Table 5. We find a
large, positive and significant effect of completing an
associate’s degree in a for-profit college on subsequent
earnings on the order of 20% over dropouts. Given the
potential endogeneity of completion in our model we
hesitate to overemphasize the finding, but future research
into for-profit college quality should carefully explore the
margin of completion versus attendance at for-profit
colleges.32
Table 5
Heterogeneous effects and alternate samples, log weekly earnings.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Post-Education 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.02 0.009 0.028 0.018
[0.033] [0.033] [0.034] [0.036] [0.036] [0.034] [0.018]
Post-Educ * For-Profit 0.103*** 0.097** 0.019 0.075** 0.135*** 0.122***
[0.037] [0.049] [0.040] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038]
Post-Educ * For-Profit* 0.012
4-year FP [0.063]
Post-Educ * For-Profit* 0.198***
AA Degree [0.045]
Post-Educ * Any College 0.088***
[0.020]





























Observations 19,364 19,364 19,364 19,022 19,005 16,300 33,502
Individuals 2627 2627 2627 2581 2585 2175 4459
Robust standard errors clustered at the individual level in brackets.
Note: All regressions include age fixed effects, year fixed effects, age fixed effects * race, age fixed effects * male, an indicator for the years when individuals
are in college, a county of residence trend, and an indicator for the two years before for-profit students begin college. See Table 2 and the text for desciptions
of the Post-Education and Post-Education * For-Profit variables. For-Profit * 4-year is an indicator for for-profit students who attended or completed an
associate’s degree program in a four-year for-profit college. AA degree is an indicator for individuals who complete an associate’s degree in a for-profit
college. Any college is an indicator for individuals who attended or completed an associate’s degree program in either a for-profit or public college.
* p < 0.1.
** p < 0.05.
*** p < 0.01.
31 We conduct a similar exercise to test for a differential effect by gender
(not reported). We find no significant difference in the earnings gains for
men and women, perhaps because we do not have enough power to
detect differences in our small sample.
32 A few studies address these endogeneity problems. For example,
Jepsen et al. (in press) use unique data on whether a student aspires to
complete a degree in their first year, their first year courses, and field ofstudy to capture differences in intent between degree completers versus
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ples by dropping three types of individuals. We first
p 46 students who report attending both for-profit and
lic institutions in the year of degree completion or the
r of last observed enrollment (for dropouts), in
cification (4). When we drop these students, we find
t the return to for-profit college attendance is
rginally lower at 7.5%. It could be that higher ability
dents transfer to public institutions either to finish their
ociate’s degree or to begin a bachelor’s degree
gram.33
In specification (5), we drop the 42 ‘‘double dropouts’’,
ividuals who drop out of for-profit colleges and re-
oll. The results are somewhat higher than our baseline
rns, at about 13.5%, as we might expect since double
pouts are undoubtedly negatively selected. In specifi-
ion (6), we drop 452 individuals who report ever
rking towards a bachelor’s degree in our high school
y group. In contrast to the double dropouts, these
ividuals are likely positively selected, or at least have
her aspirations than others in the high school only
up, as they are attending public and not-for-profit
titutions with the (unrealized) goal of obtaining a
helor’s degree.34 In this specification we find that for-
fit students earn 12.2 percentage points over high
ool graduates.
Finally, in specification (7) we test for a differential
return between for-profit students and public community
college students by adding to our sample 1832 individuals
who pursued or obtained an associate’s degree in the
public sector. In this specification, the variable Post refers
to the post-education (or falsified post) period for all
groups. Post * AnyCollege captures the differential gains to
any type of college attendance (public or for-profit) over
the high school only group. And, Post * AnyCollege * ForPro-
fit captures the further differential effect of post-education
for the for-profit students. Interestingly, we find no
differential return to attending a for-profit college relative
to a public community college. The point estimate on
Post * AnyCollege * ForProfit is positive but small and
statistically insignificant. Our results imply lower returns
to community colleges than found in other studies
(Jacobson et al., 2005; Jepsen et al., in press), perhaps
because we exclude students who go on to obtain a
bachelor’s degree in our analysis. If community college
students are more likely to transfer and complete
bachelor’s degrees than for-profit students, these esti-
mates may understate the differences between the sectors.
6.4. Matching estimation
The individual fixed effects analysis addresses what we
believe to be the most important endogeneity problem, i.e.,
unobservable differences in ability and motivation be-
tween students. But, it is open to critiques. For example,
the time-varying characteristics of the control group of
high school graduates may differ from the for-profit
students in a systematic manner that we do not observe.
As an alternative to the fixed effects estimation, we present
le 6
ching estimation, log weekly earnings.
Matched sample individual FE estimates Matching estimates Avg. Post
Educ Earnings
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
st-Education 0.012 0.081 0.027
[0.033] [0.054] [0.054]























servations 19,364 6897 6641 1646 1540
bust standard errors clustered at the individual level in brackets.
: In columns 2 and 3 we first use propensity scores to create a matched sample of individuals who attended for-profit colleges to high school graduates.
use the following observables in constructing the matched sample: indicators for age, male, race, 1999 ASVAB math and verbal score percent, average
period hourly wage, and average pre-period hours. In column 3 we also match on the county of residence in 1997. Then, we run our preferred fully
ed individual FE specification on this matched sample. See Table 2 and the text for descriptions of the Post-Education and Post-Education * For-Profit
ables. In columns 4 and 5 we report estimates using the 5-nearest neighbors matching estimator. We match on the same set of variables as in columns
d 3 respectively. The dependent variable in the matching estimations is the log of average post-education weekly earnings and we report bootstrapped
dard errors.
p < 0.1.
 p < 0.05.
* p < 0.01.
Note, however, that these students never finish a bachelor’s degree
 to our sample restriction.
Note, again, that these students never finish a bachelor’s degree and
 must be working before and after attending to contribute to
tification. So even though they may be positively selected on
rations, they may not be positively selected on other dimensions.
S.R. Cellini, L. Chaudhary / Economics of Education Review 43 (2014) 125–140138propensity score matching estimates in Table 6. This
strategy can generate a more comparable control group,
but it relies on a much smaller sample and cannot control
for unobserved differences across groups.
We undertake two different matching exercises. First,
we create a one-to-one matched sample of high school
graduates to for-profit students. As a baseline, we match on
indicators for age, male, race, average hourly wage for the
pre-period, average hours worked for the pre-period and a
measure of cognitive ability, the Armed Services Vocation-
al Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) math and verbal score taken in
1999. Our preferred specification adds the 1997 county of
residence to the list of match variables. Then, we run our
preferred fully loaded individual FE estimation on this
matched sample. The results are reported in specifications
2 and 3 of Table 6. The estimates on Post * ForProfit are
similar to the individual FE for the entire sample
(specification 1). In the matched sample, for-profit
students earn 12.5% more than high school graduates,
but the effect drops to 11% when we include the
1997 county of residence in the match. In comparison,
the individual FE coefficient for the full non-matched
sample suggest returns of 10.3% (specification 1).
Second, we report estimates from a more traditional
propensity score matching in specifications 4 and 5 using
the five-nearest neighbors matching method.35 We match
on the same set of variables described above (specification
4) and include the 1997 county of residence in specifica-
tion 5. The dependent variable in these regressions is the
log of average weekly earnings in the post-education
period. Again the results are similar to the individual FE.
Without controlling for the 1997 county, results are larger
and closer to our OLS results (Table 2, columns 1 and 2),
around 15%. When adding county to the match, our results
are closer to our fixed effects estimates (11%), suggesting
that geography plays an important role in selection. More
importantly, the similarity of the FE and matching
estimates suggests that time-varying unobservables are
not driving our results.
7. Concluding remarks
This study takes a step toward assessing the quality of
for-profit postsecondary education, estimating the before–
after earnings gains of students pursuing associate’s
degrees in for-profit institutions. Using an individual fixed
effects approach and data from the restricted-access
NLSY97, we find that students who enroll in for-profit
institutions experience earnings gains of about 10% over
individuals who complete high school without any college
degree, conditional on employment, in the 3 or 4 years
after attendance. Given that the average length of
associate’s degree program attendance is 2.6 years, this
amounts to a 4% return per year of education. Uncondi-
tional estimates raise our estimates of returns to 7% per
year due to a slight increase in the likelihood of full-time
employment among for-profit students.
Our estimates are robust to a wide array of specification
checks. In extensions, we find no differential returns
between four-year and two-year for-profit colleges and
only minor differences when we exclude small groups of
students who may be positively or negatively selected. We
also find that students who complete degrees in for-profits
earn 20% more than dropouts, but we cannot fully control
for the endogeneity of completion in our model.
Overall, it is noteworthy that the returns to for-profit
attendance appear positive and significant in all speci-
fications and they are somewhat higher than the only
other panel estimates of returns to for-profit colleges that
we know of Turner (2012). We further find no difference
in the returns between public community college
students and for-profit students. However, our estimates
for both groups fall below similar estimates of the returns
to public community college associate’s degree programs
(Jacobson et al., 2005; Jepsen et al., in press) and well
below the average returns to bachelor’s degree atten-
dance in the literature (Oreopolous & Petronijevic, 2013).
Of course, we note that our estimates are for a small
sample of young workers and we should be cautious
comparing these returns to other samples and longer-
term estimates.
Until now, we have focused solely on the private benefit
to a for-profit education, but it is important to weigh these
benefits against the cost of attendance. Tuition at a two-
year aid-eligible for-profit college averages $14,000 per
year compared to just $3000 at a public community college
(National Center for Education Statistics (NCES), 2012). To
pay for these programs, for-profit students take on more
debt than students in other sectors. Almost 90% of students
in aid-eligible for-profits borrow to finance their education
and their loans average $7300 annually – more than any
other sector (Cellini & Darolia, 2014). Added to this,
roughly 22% of students default on their student loans
within 3 years (U.S. Department of Education, 2011). These
patterns are concerning, especially if average earnings
gains are fairly low.
The most important question then becomes whether
for-profit students’ earnings gains are sufficient to offset
both the private and social costs of education in this sector.
Recent work assessing the costs of a for-profit associate’s
degree to students and taxpayers finds that a return of 8.5%
per year is needed to offset the private costs to students of
attending, including tuition, foregone earnings, and debt
service. Adding in the cost to taxpayers (including federal
and state grants, loan defaults, and subsidies) raises the
needed return to 9.8% (Cellini, 2012). All of our conditional
estimates fall well below both thresholds, suggesting that
for the average student, the short-run returns appear to be
too low to justify the private cost and much too low to
justify the additional cost to taxpayers, at least for the
federal aid-eligible institutions that we examine here.
However, our unconditional estimates and those for
degree completers come much closer to the benchmark
for private costs, suggesting that some above-average
students who complete degrees and find employment may
find a for-profit college education worthwhile. It may also
35 Our results are robust to using fewer or more neighbors in the match,
and to using other matching techniques such as kernel. We use psmatch2
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er than those presented here.
Still, from a student’s perspective, it would seem that a
er-cost community college would likely be a better
ice than a for-profit associate’s degree program. It may
the case that students are unaware of the options
ilable at local community colleges (Cellini, 2009) and
 cannot rule out that aggressive recruiters in the private
tor might mislead students into believing that the
nings gains will be higher than in the public sector
ited States Government Accountability Office (GAO),
0). On the other hand, students may simply value other
ibutes of for-profit colleges. For example, some
grams may be offered in the private sector that are
 offered in the public sector, and public institutions may
capacity constrained, making for-profit institutions the
y viable option.
This study is just a first step toward understanding the
lity of education in the for-profit sector. More studies
ng alternative data sources and methods are needed to
nitively assess student outcomes in for-profit postsec-
ary institutions.
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